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Although the impact of dopamine on reward learning is well documented, its influence on other aspects of behavior remains the subject of
much ongoing work. Dopaminergic drugs are known to increase risk-taking behavior, but the underlying mechanisms for this effect are not
clear. We probed dopamine’s role by examining the effect of its precursor L-DOPA on the choices of healthy human participants in an
experimental paradigm that allowed particular components of risk to be distinguished. We show that choice behavior depended on a baseline
(ie, value-independent) gambling propensity, a gambling preference scaling with the amount/variance, and a value normalization factor.
Boosting dopamine levels specifically increased just the value-independent baseline gambling propensity, leaving the other components
unaffected. Our results indicate that the influence of dopamine on choice behavior involves a specific modulation of the attractiveness of risky
options—a finding with implications for understanding a range of reward-related psychopathologies including addiction.
Neuropsychopharmacology (2016) 41, 2658–2667; doi:10.1038/npp.2016.68; published online 1 June 2016
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INTRODUCTION
Dopamine has a fundamental role in adaptive behavior,
having a well-established influence on reward learning.
Phasic dopaminergic bursts encode a prediction error signal
(Schultz et al, 1997; O'Doherty et al, 2003; Tobler et al, 2005;
D'Ardenne et al, 2008; Hart et al, 2014) that is a central
element in learning rewarding contingencies (Montague
et al, 1996). Other evidence indicates that dopamine impacts
ongoing behavior in a way that is orthogonal to learning,
something that speaks to a broader range of functions
(Berridge, 2007; Zhang et al, 2009) that are subject of much
recent work (Palmiter, 2008; Rigoli et al, 2016a; Sharot, et al,
2009a; Pine et al, 2010; Jocham et al, 2011; Guitart-Masip
et al, 2012; Shiner et al, 2012; Wunderlich et al, 2012;
Norbury et al, 2013).
One important influence of dopamine relates to risk-
taking behavior. Data on rodents and humans, including
Parkinson’s disease patients, indicate that dopaminergic
drugs increase risk-taking behavior (Molina et al, 2000;
Cools et al, 2003; Cools, 2006; St Onge and Floresco, 2008;
Rutledge et al, 2015). However, the precise mechanisms
underlying this effect are unclear. For example, dopamine
might affect a baseline (ie, value-independent) propensity
towards risk (Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Friston et al, 2013;
Rutledge et al, 2015; Rigoli et al, 2016b) or the attribution of
subjective value to different reward magnitudes (Berridge,
2007; Zhang et al, 2009). Another possibility is that
dopamine might encode choice precision, leading to the
prediction that boosting dopamine levels would result in
increased choice consistency when similar choices are
repeatedly presented (Friston et al, 2013). Finally, dopamine
might affect a normalization process that adapts values to a
contextual reward distribution (Tobler et al, 2005; Niv et al,
2007; Rigoli et al, 2016b).
We tested predictions arising out of these varying accounts
for the role of dopamine in decision-making in a double-
blind, within-subjects design involving administration of
either the dopamine precursor levodopa (L-DOPA) or placebo
across different sessions. We analyzed participants’ choice
behavior in a gambling paradigm (Rigoli et al, 2016b) where,
crucially, several components of risk preference could be
disentangled: a baseline risk propensity, a risk propensity
dependent on amount/variance, a normalization factor, and
an index of choice precision.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were pre-screened to ensure no existing medical
conditions or allergies. Thirty-seven healthy right-handed
adults with a maximum weight of 70 kg started the
experiment. The weight cutoff was implemented to maximize
a putative effect of L-DOPA, given the well-established
relationship between weight and the effect of this drug on
cognition when the dose is fixed (Zappia et al, 2002; Knecht
et al, 2004; Chowdhury et al, 2013; Rutledge et al, 2015).
None of the participants had any history of head injury, a
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diagnosis of any neurological or psychiatric condition
(including gambling-related or addiction-related pathologies),
or was currently on a medication known to affect the central
nervous system. Three subjects were excluded from analyses
owing to withdrawal after the first session, one participant
because she/he felt unwell during the L-DOPA session, and
another participant because of an exclusive selection of the
option on the left side of the screen (see below). Therefore,
the final experimental sample included thirty-two partici-
pants (16 females; age: mean= 23.4, median= 22; SD= 4.7;
weight: mean= 61 kg, median= 60 kg, SD= 7.3). The study
was approved by the University College of London Research
Ethics Committee.
Drug Manipulation and Procedure
Participants were tested at the Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, London, in a double-blind, counterbalanced,
and placebo-controlled repeated-measures setting consisting of
three sessions taking place across different days. Sessions were
spaced 3 to 11 days apart and, for each participant, started
approximately at the same time to minimize circadian effects.
A first session solely involved performing a gambling task.
During the second and third sessions, participants were
administered either L-DOPA (150 mg L-DOPA/37.5 mg
benserazide; Madopar) or placebo (500 mg ascorbic acid).
Drug/placebo administration order was counterbalanced
with 14 individuals receiving L-DOPA on the second session.
Following drug/placebo administration and a 45-min break,
participants performed the same task as in the first session.
A subjective state questionnaire was filled three times,
namely before drug/placebo administration and before and
after the task. Comparison between the different scores did
not show statistically significant differences when correcting
for multiple comparisons (Supplementary Table S1). Drug/
placebo was mixed with orange juice by a researcher who did
not conduct testing, assuring a double-blind procedure.
Experimental Paradigm
In each session, participants performed a 40-min gambling
task (Figure 1) where on each trial they chose between a sure
monetary amount, which changed trial-to-trial, and an equal
probability (50–50) gamble between zero and double the
amount. Note that the two options had always equal expected
value (EV), corresponding to the sum of monetary amounts
associated with possible outcomes, each multiplied by its
probability. Crucially, the task was arranged in blocks
involving a low-value context, in which EVs were drawn
from a £1–£5 uniform distribution, and a high-value context,
in which EVs were drawn from a £2–£6 uniform distribu-
tion. Participants completed 2 blocks per context, with each
block comprising 140 trials and lasting about 10 min. The
two contexts alternated, and the initial context was counter-
balanced across subjects.
At the beginning of each block, the range of the upcoming
reward distribution was displayed for 8 s. For each trial, after
a 1.5-s inter-trial interval, the certain monetary amount and
gamble were displayed on the left and right sides of the
screen, with their positions pseudorandomized. Participants
chose the left or right option by pressing the corresponding
button on a keypad. Immediately after choice, the chosen
option was displayed for 300 ms followed by the outcome for
1 s. Participants had 3 s to respond, and late responses were
met with a statement ‘too late’ and a zero outcome. On
average, participants missed two trials in the first session,
and one trial in the second and third sessions. At the end of
each session, one outcome was randomly selected and added
to an initial participation payment of £30.
For each session, before the task, participants were fully
instructed on task contingencies and on the rules determin-
ing the participation payment. The monetary amounts
selected for each session as additional payment were revealed
only after the final session, when payment was carried out.
Computational Modeling
We characterized choice behavior by implementing the same
computational model as in our previous study (Rigoli et al,
2016b). The model takes the form of a standard mean-
variance return account for which the subjective value of an
option x is V xð Þ ¼ meanðxÞ þ a varianceðxÞ: This model has
three free parameters: τ is a context parameter, which
implements a (subtractive) normalization; α is a value
function parameter, which determines whether reward
variance increases (α40) or decreases (αo0) the subjective
value of risky options; and μ is a gambling bias parameter,
which determines a baseline propensity to gamble regardless
of which options are presented. Taking A as the sure
monetary amount and w as an indicator of the low-value
(w ¼ 0Þ or high-value context (w ¼ 1), then the subjective
value of the certain option is VCERT ¼ A wt so that a
positive context parameter τ reduces this value in the
high-value context. The subjective value of the risky gamble
is VGAMB ¼ A wtþ a A wtð Þ2 þ m. The probability of
choosing the gamble is given by a sigmoidal choice rule
s VGAMB  VCERTð Þ ¼ 1=ð1þ exp ðVGAMB  VCERTð ÞÞ:
The effects postulated by the model in determining
gambling probability as a function of different trial EV and
Figure 1 Experimental paradigm. Participants repeatedly made choices
between sure gains and gambles associated with either double the sure gain
or zero, each with a 50% probability. After choice, the unchosen option
disappeared, and after 300 ms, the trial outcome was shown for 1 s. The
intertrial interval (ITI) was 1.5 s. Participants performed the task in three
separate sessions and in the second and third sessions received either
L-DOPA or placebo (ascorbic acid). One outcome was randomly selected
from those collected in each session, selected outcomes were added and
the resulting amount was paid out to participants. Information on the
outcomes selected was provided only after the final session.
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different parameter sets are represented in Supplementary
Figure S1. This shows that (i) for positive and negative value
function parameter α, the propensity to gamble for larger
EVs increases and decreases, respectively, (ii) larger gam-
bling bias parameter μ increases the overall propensity to
gamble, (iii) the context parameter τ determines whether, in
the high compared with low value context, the subjective
values attributed to EV increases (τo0) or—as predicted by
a value normalization hypothesis—decreases (τ40), impact-
ing on gambling propensity.
We estimated the values of the parameters using function
fminsearch in Matlab, without enforcing any constraint. We
took the best fitting out of 50 locally optimal parameter sets,
sampling initial values randomly from Gaussian distribu-
tions with mean 0 and SD 2. For estimation, trials with RTs
longer than 3 s (ie, associated with ‘too late’ statement) were
discarded (implying that 53 615 trials remained for all
subjects and sessions). We used Bayesian model comparison
to compare our model with simpler versions in which one or
two parameters were fixed, and with more complex versions
in which one or more parameters were each replaced by
separate parameters for each of the three sessions. Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) scores were computed for each
model fit and summed across subjects. BIC scores penalize
for parameter number and the model with the lowest BIC
score is preferred.
RESULTS
Effects of Time
We first sought to replicate previous findings from a study
using the identical task (Rigoli et al, 2016b). As before,
we found that the average gambling percentage did not
differ from 50% (session 1 (S1): Mean= 45.54, SD= 19.99,
t(31)= 1.26, p= 0.22; session 2 (S2): Mean= 45.93,
SD= 22.49, t(31)= 1.0, p= 0.31; session 3 (S3): Mean= 47.40,
SD= 23.23, t(31)= 0.6, p= 0.53; two-tailed p= 0.05 is used as
significant threshold throughout). We estimated a logistic
regression model of choice including the trial EV as predictor
(remember that, by design, the two options always had
equivalent EV). The EV-related beta weight (a measure we
refer to as gambling slope) did not differ significantly from
zero, indicating that participants did not gamble more with
large or small EVs (S1: t(31)= 0.2, p= 0.84; S2: t(31)= 0.3,
p= 0.80; S3: t(31)= 0.3, p= 0.77). We found no difference in
gambling percentage between low- and high-value contexts
(S1: t(31)=− 0.306, p= 0.762; S2: t(31)=− 0.891, p= 0.380;
S3: t(31)=− 0.968, p= 0.341) even when considering gam-
bles for EVs that overlapped in the two contexts
(S1: t(31)= 0.127, p= 0.900; S2: t(31)=− 0.574, p= 0.570;
S3: t(31)=− 0.403, p= 0.689).
There was a correlation between the intercept of the
logistic regression and gambling slope (S1: r(32)=− 0.974,
po0.001; S2: r(32)=− 0.962, po0.001; S3: r(32)=− 0.976,
po0.001; note that estimation of the latter is unaffected by
which intercept is assumed), whereas there was no correla-
tion between average gambling percentage and gambling
slope (Figure 2; Supplementary Figure S1: r(32)=− 0.121,
p= 0.508; S2: r(32)= 0.063, p= 0.732; S3: r(32)=− 0.077,
p= 0.676). This suggests that average gambling percentage
and tendency to gamble with large or small EV (captured by
the gambling slope) are two different dimensions.
Value normalization predicts that participants with a
gambling preference for larger EVs gamble more when EVs
that overlap across contexts (ie, in the £2–£5 range) are
relatively larger, namely in the low-value context. Conversely,
participants with a gambling preference for smaller EVs
would gamble more when overlapping EVs are relatively
smaller, namely in the high-value context. Therefore, we
predicted that the individual gambling slope correlated with
the difference in gambling for overlapping EVs across
Figure 2 Relationship among decision indexes within each session. The first row shows the relationship between mean gambling percentage and gambling
slope, corresponding to the beta weight associated with EV in a logistic regression model of gambling choice. The second row reports the relationship
between gambling slope and the difference in gambling percentage between overlapping EVs of the two contexts (£2–£5 range for low- minus high-value
context). Different columns indicate sessions (S1= session 1; S2= session 2; S3= session 3). For the first relationship, in no case did we observe a significant
correlation (p40.5), whereas for the second relationship, we observed a significant correlation in all sessions (po0.005).
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contexts. This was confirmed in all sessions by partial
correlations between gambling slope and gambling percentage
in the low-value context controlling for the high-value context
(S1: r(29)= 0.454, p= 0.010; S2: r(29)= 0.511, p= 0.003; S3: r
(29)= 0.484, p= 0.006). Altogether, these data replicate
previous findings (Rigoli et al, 2016b). The findings indicate
that two partially independent factors contribute to risk-taking
behavior, namely a baseline risk propensity (captured by the
average gambling) and a preference dependent on EV
(captured by the gambling slope, which was uncorrelated
with the average gambling). Consistent with value normal-
ization, participants who prefer gambling with large/small
EVs also gamble more when equivalent EVs are relatively
larger/smaller compared with the context (as captured by the
correlation between gambling slope and gambling difference
for overlapping EVs).
Next, we investigated cross-section stability in choice
behavior. We did not observe any systematic difference in
gambling percentage across sessions (F(2,62)= 0.4, p= 0.671)
nor in the difference in gambling percentage between contexts
(for all choices: F(2,62)= 0.330, p= 0.720; for overlapping
EVs: F(2,62)= 0.304, p= 0.739). Also, we observed a correla-
tion across sessions (Supplementary Figure S2) for the
gambling percentage (S1 and S2: r(32)= 0.861, po0.001; S1
and S3: r(32)= 0.834, po0.001; S2 and S3: r(32)= 0.843,
po0.001), the gambling slope (S1 and S2: r(32)= 0.726,
po0.001; S1 and S3: r(32)= 0.833, po0.001; S2 and S3:
r(32)= 0.849, po0.001), and the contextual differences for
overlapping EVs (S1 and S2: r(32)= 0.505, p= 0.003; S1 and
S3: r(32)= 0.594, po0.001; S2 and S3: r(32)= 0.682,
po0.001), suggesting these measures underpin stable traits.
To investigate whether dopamine is linked with choice
precision (Friston et al, 2013), we estimated two components
of this putative factor. The first is the absolute value of the
gambling slope, indicating how much the EV is taken into
consideration during choice. Note that a larger absolute
gambling slope entails an increased choice precision because
of greater choice consistency for similar EVs. The second is
the absolute difference between average gambling percentage
and 50%, a measure we refer to as baseline choice precision,
as it indicates overall choice consistency. Both measures were
correlated across sessions (absolute gambling slope: S1 and
S2: r(32)= 0.618, po0.001; S1 and S3: r(32)= 0.760,
po0.001; S2 and S3: r(32)= 0.707, po0.001; baseline choice
precision: S1 and S2: r(32)= 0.688, po0.001; S1 and S3:
r(32)= 0.643, po0.001; S2 and S3: r(32)= 0.743, po0.001).
The absolute gambling slope changed across sessions
(F(2,62)= 7.249, p= 0.001), an effect driven by a smaller
absolute gambling slope in the first session (S1 vs S2:
t(31)=− 2.95, p= 0.006; S1 vs S3: t(31)=− 3.722, p= 0.001;
S2 vs S3: t(31)=− 0.681, p= 0.501). An increased absolute
gambling slope after the first session indicates that choice
dependency on EV is enhanced after a first exposure to the
task. This may be connected to evidence showing a tendency
to rely more on a strategy after this strategy is repeatedly
selected (Sharot et al, 2009b). Baseline choice precision did
not differ significantly across sessions (F(2,62)= 1.084,
p= 0.345).
Model-Based Analysis
According to model comparison, in the best model of choice
behavior (see Materials and Methods), the gambling bias
parameter μ and the value function parameter α differed
across sessions while the context parameter τ did not
(Table 1; Supplementary Figure S3). To assess whether the
best model was better than chance for all subjects, we
compared individual BIC scores of the best model with BIC
scores of the random model. For every single participant, the
BIC score of the best model was smaller than the BIC score
of the random model. Thus, no participant was better fit by
pure chance.
The parameters in the model are expected to provide
quantitative characterizations of elements of behavior. As
predicted, the context parameter τ was significantly positive
(t(31)= 3.03, p= 0.005), consistent with value normalization
in which subjective values were rescaled to the contextual
reward distribution. Note that in the model,
VGAMB  VCERT ¼ a A wtð Þ2 þ m. This is similar to a
simple logistic regression, where the value function para-
meter α corresponds to a slope parameter and the gambling
bias parameter μ corresponds to an intercept. According to
this, the value function parameter α was correlated with the
gambling slope, suggesting that both capture a preference to
gamble with large or small trial amount (S1: r(32)= 0.990,
po0.001; S2: r(32)= 0.985, po0.001; S3: r(32)= 0.957,
Table 1 Comparison Among Behavioral Models of Choice
Behavior
Free parameters BIC Negative Log-
likelihood
Pseudo-R2
Random 74326 37163 0
μ 64536 32265 0.13
α 65099 32546 0.12
τ 74270 37132 0
μ, α 54441 27214 0.27
μ, τ 64774 32181 0.13
α, τ 64830 32409 0.13
μ, α, τ 53798 26890 0.28
μ1, μ2, μ3, α, τ 52769 26369 0.29
μ, α1, α2, α3, τ 52298 26133 0.30
μ, α, τ1, τ2, τ3 53081 26525 0.29
μ1, μ2, μ3, α1, α2, α3, τ *50996 25476 0.32
μ1, μ2, μ3, α, τ1, τ2, τ3 52604 26280 0.29
μ, α1, α2, α3, τ1, τ2, τ3 52471 26213 0.29
μ1, μ2, μ3, α1, α2, α3, τ1, τ2,
τ3
51148 25546 0.32
Models are estimated from all trials excluding missed trials. The first column
reports the free parameters of each model. The baseline model includes a
gambling bias parameter μ, a value function parameter α, and a context
parameter τ. This model is compared with simpler models where one or more of
these parameters are fixed, and with more complex models where one or more
of these parameters are replaced by three parameters, one for each session
(indicated by subscripts). According to BIC statistic, the best model (marked with
an asterisk) includes separate baseline gambling parameters μ and value function
parameters α for each session while the context coefficient parameter τ is
equivalent across sessions. Negative log-likelihood and Pseudo-R2 of models are
reported in the third and fourth column, respectively.
Dopamine and gambling
F Rigoli et al
2661
Neuropsychopharmacology
po0.001), but it was not correlated with the average
gambling percentage (S1: r(32)=− 0.062, p= 0.735; S2:
r(32)= 0.133, p= 0.470; S3: r(32)= 0.019, p= 0.917). The
gambling bias parameter μ correlated with the intercept of
the logistic regression model of choice having the EV as
predictor (S1: r(32)= 0.981, po0.001; S2: r(32)= 0.976,
po0.001; S3: r(32)= 0.941, po0.001). Similarly to the
logistic regression, the gambling bias parameter μ and the
value function parameter α were inversely correlated
(S1: r(32)=− 0.892, po0.001; S2: r(32)=− 0.879, po0.001;
S3: r(32)=− 0.871, po0.001). However, note that a correla-
tion between intercept and slope does not affect the estimate
of the slope and maintains the two parameters identifiable
during model fitting (see below for recovery analyses).
To analyze whether the model is able to explain raw
behavioral analyses, we used the model together with
subject-specific parameters estimates to generate simulated
data (from the same number of trials as in the real
experiment; ie, 560 trials per subject) and performed exactly
the same behavioral analyses on the simulated data that we
had used for the experimental data. For this analysis, we
focused on the first session alone and compared a model
with the three parameters α, μ, and τ against models where
one of these parameters was fixed to zero. Consistent with
real data, the full model replicated the lack of correlation
between average gambling and the gambling slope (ie, the
slope of the logistic regression having EV as regressor;
r(32)=− 0.091, p= 0.624), while a correlation emerged when
data were simulated using a model without the gambling bias
parameter μ (r(32)= 0.78, po0.001). Moreover, again
consistent with empirical data, the full model replicated the
partial correlation between the gambling slope and the
gambling for choices that overlapped across context in the
low-value context controlling for the high value-context
(r(29)= 0.490, p= 0.007). This was not obtained when data
were simulated using a model without the value function
parameter α (r(32)= 0.03, p= 0.89) or without the context
parameter τ (r(32)=− 0.08, p= 0.663). We also inspected
that the model which best explained the data (ie, with
parameter α and μ varying and τ not varying across sessions)
could replicate the raw behavioral analyses. Hence, we
simulated data with this model and found a lack of
correlation between average gambling and the gambling
slope (S1: r(32)=− 0.05, p= 0.786; S2: r(32)=− 0.02,
p= 0.913; S3: r(32)=− 0.09, p= 0.624), and a partial correla-
tion between the gambling slope and the gambling for choices
that overlapped across context in the low-value context
controlling for the high value-context (S1: r(29)= 0.40,
p= 0.032; S2: r(29)= 0.52, p= 0.003; S3: r(29)= 0.53,
p= 0.003). Next, we fitted the model to the simulated
data and the estimated parameters were correlated with the
true parameters across individuals (τ: r(29)= 0.85, po0.001;
S1: α: r(29)= 0.97, po0.001; μ: r(29)= 0.92, po0.001; S2: α:
r(29)= 0.98, po0.001; μ: r(29)= 0.91, po0.001; S3: α:
r(29)= 0.95, po0.001; μ: r(29)= 0.94, p= 0.001). Collectively,
these analyses validate the mean-return model and show that
it is able to reproduce raw behavioral analyses and that
parameters can be estimated reliably.
Next, we assessed cross-session stability of parameters. The
individual gambling bias parameters μ were correlated across
sessions (S1 and S2: r(32)= 0.797, po0.001; S1 and S3:
r(32)= 0.854, po0.001; S2 and S3: r(32)= 0.882, po0.001) as
well as the value function coefficients α (S1 and S2:
r(32)= 0.667, po0.001; S1 and S3: r(32)= 0.775, po0.001;
S2 and S3: r(32)= 0.813, po0.001), consistent with these
measures underlying stable individual risk attitudes.
Recent evidence from rodent data suggests that dopamine
mediates the effect of recent reward history on risky choice
(Stopper et al, 2014). We asked whether participants were
affected by previous outcomes by estimating, for each
session, a logistic regression model of choice including
reward prediction error at the previous trial (ie, equal to zero
for choices of the sure option, equal to the monetary
outcome minus the EV for choices of gamble) as predictor.
Computing the BIC for this model and for a model including
an intercept parameter only, and summing BICs for all
sessions, the simpler model was preferred (BIC= 63798 vs
BIC= 63491), suggesting that participants’ choices were not
affected by previous outcomes.
Effects of Drug Manipulation
Our main research goal was to investigate effects of L-DOPA
compared with placebo on risk-taking behavior. On the basis
of a hypothesis that dopamine boosts overall risk-taking, an
increased average gambling percentage is predicted under
L-DOPA (Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Friston et al, 2013;
Rutledge et al, 2015; Rigoli et al, 2016b). By contrast, based
on the idea that dopamine influences the value assigned to
different reward magnitudes, a difference in gambling slope
would be predicted across drug/placebo (Berridge, 2007;
Zhang et al, 2009). Contrary to most previous studies, these
two predictions could be disentangled as the two indexes
were uncorrelated in the task. Furthermore, we were able to
consider the possibility that L-DOPA influences choice
precision (Friston et al, 2013), operationalized as baseline
choice precision and absolute gambling slope. Finally, we
considered the impact of L-DOPA on contextual normal-
ization by computing, for each subject, the product between
the gambling slope and the difference in gambling percen-
tage for overlapping EVs across contexts. We refer to this
measure as corrected context effect and it was implemented
to capture a propensity for subjects who preferred to gamble
with large/small EVs also to gamble more when the same
EVs were relatively larger/smaller. Consistent with contex-
tual normalization, the corrected context effect was sig-
nificantly positive in all sessions (S1: t(31)= 2.7, p= 0.011;
S2: t(31)= 3.45, p= 0.002; S3: t(31)= 3.39, p= 0.002). This
index was expected to be affected by our drug manipulation
according to a hypothesis that different levels of dopamine
alter reward contextual normalization. A final prediction we
considered is that boosting dopamine levels would imply that
all rewards would appear subjectively less or more valuable,
resulting in changes of average gambling in participants with
convex and concave subjective value functions (but in
opposite directions).
Given the same dosage (150 mg) was administered to all
participants and given previous reports that the effect of
L-DOPA can depend on body weight (Zappia et al, 2002;
Knecht et al, 2004; Chowdhury et al, 2013; Rutledge et al,
2015), we considered the possibility that weight mediates the
effect of L-DOPA. In keeping with previous literature
(Zappia et al, 2002; Knecht et al, 2004; Chowdhury et al,
2013; Rutledge et al, 2015), in our analyses, we used body
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weight and not, for instance, the related measure of body
mass index. To account for body weight, participants were
assigned to low/high-weight groups (based on a median
split) and mixed-effect ANOVAs on the behavioral measures
were run with drug as within-subjects factor and weight
grouping as between-subjects factor. Results of these analyses
are reported in Table 2 and show no main or interaction
effects except for an interaction effect on average gambling
(Figure 3a-c; F(1,30)= 4.96, p= 0.034). More detailed analyses
showed that the drug–weight interaction was driven by a
larger average gambling percentage under L-DOPA compared
with placebo in low-weight (Figure 3a–c; t(15)= 2.2, p= 0.044)
but not high-weight participants (Figure 3a-c; t(15)= 0.5,
p= 0.625). This was confirmed by a similar analysis where we
observed a significant inverse partial correlation between
average gambling percentage under L-DOPA and body,
controlling for average gambling percentage under placebo
(Figure 3b; r(29)=− 0.378, p= 0.043). This supports the idea
that L-DOPA boosts risk-taking behavior. The role of weight
is not surprising given the well-established link between this
variable and effective drug dose.
To assess whether the role of weight as mediator was
confounded by age, participants were assigned to young/old
groups (based on a median split) and a mixed-effect
ANOVA on average gambling percentage was run with drug
as within-subjects factor and weight grouping as between-
subjects factor, but we found no interaction effect
(F(1,30)= 0.16, p= 0.688). However, a similar analysis
having gender as between-subjects factor showed a signifi-
cant interaction effect (F(1,30)= 4.54, p= 0.041), and we
observed higher weight in males than females (t(30)= 6.21,
po0.001). This raises the possibility that gender might
Figure 3 (a) Mean gambling percentage as a function of drug (L-DOPA vs placebo) and body weight (high vs low body weight). Larger average gambling
percentage under L-DOPA compared with placebo was observed in low-weight (t(15)= 2.2, p= 0.044) but not high-weight participants (t(15)= 0.5,
p= 0.625). (b) Relationship between the effect of L-DOPA (relative to placebo) on average gambling percentage and body weight, where blue circles
represent females (n= 16) and green circles represent males (n= 16). We observed a significant inverse partial correlation between average gambling
percentage under L-DOPA and body weight, controlling for average gambling percentage under placebo (b; r(29)=− 0.378, p= 0.043). A significant inverse
partial correlation was found within males (r(13)=− 0.516, p= 0.049) but not within females (r(13)=− 0.078, p= 0.782), possibly because of a ceiling effect,
as females had substantial lower weight than males. This suggests that weight and not gender mediated an effect of drug on average gambling percentage.
(c) Difference in gambling percentage between L-DOPA (white bars) and placebo (grey bars) in different groups of subjects and different conditions.
Participants are grouped according to two dimensions: (i) weight, where data for high and low body weight groups, created based on a median split, are,
respectively, displayed in the first and second row of panels; (ii) gambling slope (ie, the beta weight associated with EV in a logistic regression model of gambling
choice), where data for participants with negative and positive gambling slope in the first session are displayed in the first and second column of panels,
respectively. For each group of participants, mean gambling percentage (on the y axis) is reported for each of four standardized bins of increasing EV separated
for each context (LC: low-value context; HC: high-value context). Considering low body weight participants alone, this figure shows an increased mean
gambling percentage with L-DOPA compared with placebo in all EV bins and contexts and for both positive and negative gambling slope participants (bin 3 in
high value context for positive gambling slope participants is an exception but not statistically significant). This is confirmed by a lack of an interaction between
the different bins and the drug/placebo manipulation.
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explain the weight–drug interaction effect on average
gambling percentage. If this was the case, we would expect
no relationship between weight and effect of L-DOPA
(relative to placebo) on average gambling percentage within
subgroups, namely within males and females. Contrary to
this prediction, we found a significant inverse partial
correlation in males between average gambling percentage
under L-DOPA and body weight, controlling for average
gambling percentage under placebo (r(13)=− 0.516,
p= 0.049). No partial correlation was found in females (r
(13)=− 0.078, p= 0.782), possibly owing to a ceiling effect,
as females were substantially lighter than males.
In addition, we computed the average gambling percentage
for L-DOPA minus placebo and estimated a stepwise
regression model of this variable where both weight and
gender were considered as predictors. Independent of the
specific stepwise method used (ie, stepwise, forward, or
backward), the regression model always included weight
(t(31)= 2.34, p= 0.026) and excluded gender (t(31)=− 0.60,
p= 0.55) as predictor. These analyses are more consistent
with the possibility that weight and not gender mediated the
effect of drug on average gambling percentage, also in line
with previous findings (Rutledge et al, 2015).
Contingent on whether participants’ gambling slope was
positive or negative in the first session, subjects were also
assigned to positive/negative gambling slope groups. To test
for specific effects of EV, we grouped the different EVs in
two bins, one for EVs that are negative relative to the
contextual mean EV (£1–3 and £2–4 range in the low- and
high-value context, respectively) and the other for EVs that
are positive relative to the contextual mean EV (£3–5 and
£4–6 range in the low- and high-value context, respectively).
We implemented a mixed-effect ANOVA with drug and EV
bins as within-subjects factors, and weight and gambling
slope grouping as between-subjects factors. We observed a
significant drug–weight interaction effect (F(1,28)= 4.96,
p= 0.034) plus, unsurprisingly, a gambling slope–EV bin
interaction effect (F(1,28)= 46.16, po0.001); all other effects
were not statistically significant.
Overall, these data suggest that boosting dopamine levels
with L-DOPA enhances an average gambling propensity and
this effect does not interact with EV or with participants’
stable preferences to gamble more with small or large EVs.
DISCUSSION
Investigating choice under risk is an important probe of the
role of dopamine in decision-making. In general, drugs that
boost dopamine levels enhance the propensity to take risks
(Molina et al, 2010; Cools et al, 2003; St Onge and Floresco,
2008; Rutledge et al, 2015). However, this can be explained
by one or more mechanisms. Dopamine might increase the
overall attractiveness of gambling without regard to the stake
values (Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Friston et al, 2013;
Rutledge et al, 2015; Rigoli et al, 2016b), influence the value
attributed to different reward magnitudes (Berridge, 2007;
Zhang et al, 2009), boost choice precision (Friston et al,
2013), mediate the influence of past rewards (Frank et al,
2004; Pessiglione et al, 2006; Stopper et al, 2014), or impact
on contextual reward normalization (Tobler et al, 2005;
Rigoli et al, 2016b).
We manipulated dopamine availability using the dopamine
precursor L-DOPA while subjects performed a task designed
to isolate and test the above possibilities. We observed that
the overall mean frequency of gambling was uncorrelated
with the preference to gamble with large or small EVs. This
finding highlights two independent components of risk
preference, one tied to a baseline risk propensity and the
other to a subjective value function. We also observed reward
normalization because a difference in gambling across
contexts for equivalent EVs interacted with the preference
to gamble with large or small EVs. In other words,
participants who preferred gambling with large/small EVs
also gambled more when equivalent EVs were larger/smaller
relative to the context. As subjects performed experimental
sessions over multiple days, this allowed us to show that
individual risk preferences were stable across sessions.
Our main finding was that under L-DOPA compared with
placebo, low body weight participants (a proxy for higher
overall dopamine effect) exhibited increased mean gambling
preference. The interaction with body weight was not
surprising given the use of a fixed drug dosage and the
well-established relationship between body weight and drug
effects (Zappia et al, 2002; Knecht et al, 2004; Chowdhury
et al, 2013; Rutledge et al, 2015). Though body weight was
related with gender and hence an impact of the latter variable
cannot be completely ruled out, the fact that the effect of
drug correlated with weight within males suggests that
weight and not gender mediated the effect of L-DOPA.
The dopaminergic effect on a baseline risk propensity did
not depend on the values of the various options. A previous
study reported a similar effect on a measure akin to the
baseline risk propensity implemented here and found an
effect on gambling for gains but not for losses (Rutledge et al,
2015). However, in that study, it was impossible to tell
whether the effect depended on gains themselves or on the
fact that gain trials were as a whole preferred to all other
trials because the alternative trial types all involved losses. By
contrast, the task here only involved gain trials, with small
and large potential gains having negative and positive
valence relative to the average reward for all trials. We
showed that increased gambling under L-DOPA emerges in
all gain trials, irrespective of relative preference, because an
increased gambling under L-DOPA was evident also for EVs
below the average for all trials.
The value-independent (but, according to Rutledge et al
(2015), potentially valence-dependent) effect of dopamine on
risk has been interpreted as a form of Pavlovian approach
(Dayan et al, 2006; Rigoli et al, 2012, 2016c; Rutledge et al,
2015). This might arise from an exploration bonus associated
with potentially surprising outcomes or, more formally, from
a value attributed to outcome entropy linked to constructs
such as curiosity, intrinsic motivation, and information gain
(Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Tishby and Polani, 2011; Friston
et al, 2013; Rigoli et al, 2016b). Such an explanation would
chime with evidence that dopamine, risk preference, and
curiosity all decrease with age (Giambra et al, 1992; Deakin
et al, 2004) and with the established relationship between
dopamine and the personality trait of sensation-seeking
(Ratsma et al, 2001; Norbury et al, 2013). Another possibility
is that boosted dopamine levels act to increase the probability
estimate of positive outcomes (Friston et al, 2013), here
corresponding to the belief that larger outcomes are more
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likely after gambling. This is also consistent with evidence
of an increased optimism bias under L-DOPA (Sharot et al,
2009a) and with findings showing that amphetamine
(a drug that increases the levels of dopamine and
norepinephrine) transforms negative arousal (fear) into
positive arousal (excitement) (Knutson et al, 2004).
Our data provided no support for the suggestion that
boosting dopamine levels influences the convexity or
concavity of the value function (Berridge, 2007; Zhang
et al, 2009). This indicates that augmented risk-taking
behavior under L-DOPA cannot be interpreted as an
increased weight given to larger reward amounts. L-DOPA
also left unchanged the precision of choices (Friston et al,
2013), measured either by the distance between the mean
gambling percentage and 50% or by the absolute gambling
slope (indicating how much monetary amount was taken
into account). Further, we recently observed a link between
choice and neural adaptation to the contextual reward
distribution in the dopaminergic midbrain (Rigoli et al,
2016b). However, a prediction that the extent of individual
choice contextual adaptation would be modulated by
dopamine levels was not supported here.
We also considered an hypothesis that boosting dopamine
levels would imply that all rewards would appear subjectively
less or more valuable, resulting in changes of average
gambling in participants with convex and concave subjective
value functions (but in opposite directions). However, our
findings also did not support this prediction, suggesting
that dopaminergic levels might be unrelated to reward
normalization.
That dopamine and dopaminergic manipulations affect
learning is well established (Frank et al, 2004; Pessiglione
et al, 2006; Shohamy et al, 2006; Rutledge et al, 2009; Guitart-
Masip et al, 2012; Shiner et al, 2012; Chowdhury et al, 2013),
and this has been shown to be relevant in decision-making
under risk (Stopper et al, 2014). However, the effects
observed in our study are unlikely to depend on learning
because in our task, we found no evidence that choice was
affected by previous outcomes. We stress that our findings
do not go against the hypothesis of dopamine being involved
in learning, but demonstrate instead that manipulating
dopaminergic transmission has effects on behavior that go
beyond dopamine’s established role in learning. We also
highlight some important limitations of the study. First, the
monetary amounts used are small, and hence whether this
effect is present also with larger amounts that may be more
relevant to real-world economic decisions remains an open
question. Second, the use of monetary incentives leaves
unanswered the question as to whether our effects can be
observed also in the presence of other incentives, such as
food or drugs including those known to affect the dopamine
system. Third, dopaminergic effects on cognition can follow
an inverted U-shape function (Cools, 2006), raising the
possibility that a gambling propensity might be maximal at a
certain dopamine level and decrease as one departs from this
level. Using multiple dosages in future research might reveal
a non-linear relationship between dopaminergic transmis-
sion and risk-taking behavior. Finally, a question that
remains open is whether the effect of L-DOPA described
here is more closely related to an influence on phasic or tonic
dopaminergic activity, as it is still unknown whether
L-DOPA acts more on phasic or tonic processes (Floresco
et al, 2003; Niv et al, 2007), a question that techniques like
pharmacology combined with microdialysis and cyclic
voltammetry could address (Hart et al, 2014; Hamid et al,
2016).
In conclusion, we studied the role of dopamine in
decision-making using a gambling task that allowed us to
separate several aspects of choice behavior. Boosting
dopamine levels enhanced a baseline propensity to take
risks, but had no effect on any other aspect of choice
behavior. This raises the possibility that dopamine modulates
the attractiveness of surprising outcomes or increases an
optimism bias. Such a finding is of potential interest in
clinical populations, and suggests the possibility that patients
with abnormal dopaminergic functioning or under dopami-
nergic treatment (eg, Parkinson’s disease patients) are
differently attracted by surprising outcomes. This may help
not only in understanding psychopathologies such as
gambling and drug abuse, with well-known links with
dopamine and risk behavior, but also other conditions in
which dopamine is implicated in connection with aberrant
salience (Kapur, 2003), such as schizophrenia and attention
deficit hyperactivity. In addition, these and similar data may
suggest that one should consider measures associated with
endogenous dopamine levels, such as genetic information
(Frank et al, 2007), as possible biomarkers for screening
individuals at risk of pathological gambling.
Table 2 Effects of Drug/Placebo Manipulation on the Different Behavioral Measures
Behavioral measure Drug: main effect Weight: main effect Drug–weight interaction
Average gambling percentage F(1,30)= 1.66, p= 0.208 F(1,30)= 0.42, p= 0.520 F(1,30)= 4.96, p= 0.034*
Gambling slope F(1,30)= 0.00, p= 0.960 F(1,30)= 0.00, p= 0.943 F(1,30)= 1.34, p= 0.256
Corrected context effect F(1,30)= 1.76, p= 0.195 F(1,30)= 0.27, p= 0.604 F(1,30)= 0.03, p= 0.857
Absolute gambling slope F(1,30)= 1.41, p= 0.240 F(1,30)= 0.88, p= 0.357 F(1,30)= 0.09, p= 0.767
Baseline choice precision F(1,30)= 0.54, p= 0.390 F(1,30)= 0.00, p= 0.948 F(1,30)= 2.30, p= 0.140
Gambling bias parameter μ F(1,30)= 1.00, p= 0.325 F(1,30)= 0.47, p= 0.830 F(1,30)= 1.40, p= 0.246
Value function parameter α F(1,30)= 0.15, p= 0.698 F(1,30)= 0.241, p= 0.627 F(1,30)= 0.756, p= 0.391
To account for body weight, participants were assigned to low/high-weight groups (based on a median split) and mixed-effect ANOVAs on the behavioral measures
were run with drug as within-subjects factor and weight grouping as between-subjects factor. Results of these analyses are reported here. The interaction effect on
average gambling percentage alone is significant and is marked with an asterisk.
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